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Abstract
The aims of this study were to examine: (a) whether men with intellectual disabilities
who have a history of criminal offending attend to affective pictorial stimuli in a
biased manner, and (b) whether there is a relationship between an affective atten-
tional bias and offense‐supportive cognitions, empathy, and moral reasoning. Forty‐
six men with intellectual disabilities who had a documented history of criminal of-
fending, and 51 men who also had intellectual disabilities, but no such history, were
recruited and asked to complete a computer‐based dot‐probe task using affective
pictorial stimuli with randomization, along with measures of distorted cognitions,
empathy, and moral reasoning. Those with a history of criminal offending endorsed
significantly more offense‐supportive cognitions, had significantly lower general
empathy, and more “mature”moral reasoning, as well as a significant attentional bias
toward affective pictorial stimuli. Attentional bias significantly predicted offense‐
supportive cognitions, and vice versa, having controlled for offense history, and Full‐
Scale IQ, but this was not the case for empathy or moral reasoning. While the
findings require replication, interventions that aim to modify attention bias with this
population should be tested.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Recently, Garrigan, Adlam, and Langdon (2018) developed a Social
Information Procession and Moral Decision Making framework that
integrated social information processing and moral development
theories in an attempt to help our understanding of behavior ex-
hibited by individuals, inclusive of those experiencing atypical de-
velopment as a consequence of acquired brain injury, intellectual, or
other developmental disability. They reviewed a variety of psycho-
logical and social constructs in an attempt to knit together various
theories about moral decision‐making and behavior, such as
working memory (Gibbs, 2013), perspective taking (Baird, 2008;
Kohlberg, 1976), attention (Crick & Dodge, 1994), abstract thought
and reasoning (Baird, 2008; Piaget, 1932), logical reasoning (Piaget,
1932), schema and scripts (Arsenio & Lemerise, 2004; Hoffman,
2000; Lemerise & Arsenio, 2000), attributions (Gibbs, 2013;
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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Hoffman, 2000; Lemerise & Arsenio, 2000), affective empathy
(Gibbs, 2013; Hoffman, 2000; Kohlberg, 1984), and somatic markers
(Baird, 2008; Taber‐Thomas & Tranel, 2012).
Garrigan et al. (2018) combined these and other factors together
within a six‐step framework that has social information processing at
its core, but incorporated developmental factors that change over
time as a consequence of maturation and developmental experiences,
inclusive of socialization and related factors (e.g., socioeconomic
status and culture) as well as psychological theories about moral
development, social‐perspective taking and empathy. The aim of this
framework was to attempt to provide an explanation as to how moral
decisions are made, while further considering the processes that
impact decision‐making and develop over time via socialization and
maturation. The first step within their framework was labeled the
“encoding of cues,” which relies upon the allocation of attention and
recognition of situational cues, which is affected by the ability to
recognize emotions and empathic responsiveness. Attentional ability
is considered an important construct related to moral reasoning and
development (Gibbs, 2013). Garrigan et al. (2018) hypothesized that
shifting attention and related executive functions, as well as atten-
tional bias, will influence what information is encoded within a social
situation, thus influencing subsequent affective, cognitive, and be-
havioral responses within the latter steps within their framework.
The remaining steps in the framework are related to those outlined
by Crick and Dodge (1994, 1996) and are interpretation of cues,
clarification of goals, response access or construction, moral re-
sponse decision, and behavioral enactment. These latter steps in-
volve processing, which is triggered by the encoding of cues.
However, encoding is also impacted by top‐down processing as those
with a moral developmental delay and/or difficulty with cognitive or
affective empathy may encode social information differently. Biased
encoding may develop as a consequence of socialization and ma-
turation, inclusive of the maturation of brain regions, which may be
different for those who have conditions, which are inherently char-
acterized by atypical development, such as intellectual disabilities
(Garrigan et al., 2018).
Attentional bias and its relationship to other psychological con-
structs and behavior has been investigated within numerous studies,
especially with those who have anxiety disorders. Van Bockstaele
et al. (2014) reviewed studies examining the role of attentional bias
in our understanding of anxiety and fear and concluded that bias is
associated with anxiety and fear, and the relationship may be bidir-
ectional. They also noted that changing attentional bias changes fear
and anxiety. While the findings have not always been consistent,
attentional bias has also been shown to be related to eating disorders
(Faunce, 2002), addiction (Field & Cox, 2008), depression (Peckham,
McHugh, & Otto, 2010), psychosis (Moritz & Laudan, 2007), and
sleep disorders (Harris et al., 2015).
For those with a history of committing crimes, there is evidence
that those with antisocial personality disorder have a bias toward
violent words (Domes, Mense, Vohs, & Habermeyer, 2013); men and
women with either a history of violent or non‐violent crimes have an
attentional bias toward violent words, with those with the history
of violent crime having the most marked bias (Smith &
Waterman, 2003), sexual offenders have a bias toward sexual words
(Price & Karl Hanson, 2007; Smith & Waterman, 2004), and images
(Ciardha & Gormley, 2012); men with a history of perpetrating do-
mestic violence have a bias toward aggressive words (Chan, Raine, &
Lee, 2010), and teenage fire‐setters have an attentional bias toward
fire‐related pictures (Gallagher‐Duffy, MacKay, Duffy, Sullivan‐
Thomas, & Peterson‐Badali, 2009). Kimonis, Graham, and Cauffman
(2018) demonstrated that attention to affective pictures among
teenage boys with a history of violent crime was predicted by callous
and unemotional or uncaring traits, which was moderated by the
severity of aggression, a finding reported in previous studies
(Kimonis, Frick, Fazekas, & Loney, 2006; Kimonis, Frick, Munoz, &
Aucoin, 2008). Edalati, Walsh, and Kosson (2016) reported that
convicted offenders scoring low on a measure of psychopathy had an
attentional bias away from affective faces compared to those scoring
high, but the difference was not statistically significant; these studies
suggest that attention bias may be affected by personality, affect, and
other related constructs as outlined by Garrigan et al. (2018).
To further investigate attentional bias among those with a his-
tory of criminal offending, and whether such a bias is related to
additional psychological constructs, we recruited men with in-
tellectual disabilities who either did or did not have a history of
criminal offending. We specifically recruited a sample of men with
intellectual disabilities because they are experiencing atypical de-
velopment and are a markedly vulnerable population. We invited
participants to take part in a dot‐probe task using affective images to
examine attentional bias and to complete questionnaires about em-
pathy, offense‐supportive beliefs, and moral reasoning. The aims of
this study were twofold: (a) to investigate whether men with in-
tellectual disabilities who have a history of criminal offending attend
to affective pictorial stimuli in a biased manner, and (b) whether
there is a relationship between an affective attentional bias and
offense‐supportive cognitions, empathy, and moral reasoning. We
specifically hypothesized that (a) men with a history of criminal of-
fenses will attend to affective images more rapidly in comparison to
men with no such history, and (b) such attention biases will predict
offense‐supportive cognitions, empathy, and moral reasoning and
vice versa.
2 | METHOD
2.1 | Participants
Forty‐six men with intellectual disabilities who had a documented his-
tory of criminal offending behavior, and 51 men with intellectual dis-
abilities and no known history of engaging in criminal offending
behavior were recruited and invited to take part in this study. Those
with a history of criminal offending were recruited from secure in-
patient services within eastern England, while those without such a
history were recruited from the community. Those with a history of
crime were significantly younger, 95% bias‐corrected‐and‐accelerated
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confidence intervals—BCa CI [−12.98, −2.67], Adj. R
2 = .07, and had a
significantly higher Full‐Scale IQ, 95% BCa CI [0.59, 4.40], Adj. R2 = .05.
Data collected about mental and physical health comorbidity are found
in Table 1. Those with a history of committing criminal offenses were
more likely to have a recorded diagnosis of schizophrenia, χ2(1) = 5.98,
p = .01, or personality disorder χ2(1) = 5.98, p = .01, while those with no
such history were more likely to have difficulties with hyperten-
sion,4.65, p = .03.
2.1.1 | Eligibility criteria
Participants were considered eligible to take part in this study if they
were (a) a man aged between 18 and 65 years, (b) who had a mild
intellectual disability, (c) with the capacity to give or withhold in-
formed consent to take part in this study study, and (d) successfully
completed a practice block on the dot‐probe task defined as making
no more than one error within 10 trials. Participants with a history of
offending behaviors were only included if they had a history of
committing an indictable offense, rather than a summary offense, or
an “either‐way” offense (NB: an either‐way offense is one which can
be heard in either a Magistrate's of Crown Court). This means that
the participants included within this study had committed serious
offenses that can only be tried by a Crown court within England and
Wales. This includes offenses such as those involving violence (e.g.,
murder, manslaughter, wounding), sexual offenses, burglary, robbery,
theft, criminal damage (e.g., arson), drug offenses, and kidnapping,
among others. A full breakdown of the most recent indictable offense
for the men with intellectual disabilities who had a history of criminal
offending is found in Table 2a and was generated through both self‐
report and checking health records. Participants were excluded if
they (a) had a known history of acquired brain injury or a diagnosis of
dementia, (b) were a woman, or (c) were unable to speak English.
Women were excluded from this study for two reasons: (a) there is
some evidence that women and men may score differently on mea-
sures of related constructs, such as empathy (Baron‐Cohen &
Wheelright, 2004); and (b) the population of offenders with in-
tellectual disabilities within secure services in the United Kingdom
are predominantly men. The sample of participants in this study have
taken part in a previous study (Daniel, Sadek, & Langdon, 2018).
2.2 | Design and procedure
Utilizing a simple between‐groups design, participants were initially
invited to complete an assessment of their Full‐Scale IQ using a two‐
subtest Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechs-
ler, 1999) when no estimate of Full‐Scale IQ was available within
their records that had been completed within the last 3 years. Where
a previous estimate was available, this data was collected. Seventy‐
three percent of participants completed the WASI. Following this,
participants were invited to complete a dot‐probe task, following by
measures of empathy, distorted cognitions, and moral reasoning that
were read aloud. For the measures of empathy and distorted cogni-
tions, which required a forced‐choice response, an analogue scale
was used to help participants respond.
TABLE 1 Frequency count of mental and physical health
comorbidity among men with intellectual disabilities
Diagnoses
Offending
history (n = 46)
No offending
history (n = 51) χ2 p
Anxiety disorders 11 15 0.29 .59
Depression 9 9 0.09 .77
Autism 9 4 3.01 .08
Attention‐deficit‐
hyperactivity
5 3 0.86 .36
Personality
disorders
5* 0 5.98 .01
Schizophrenia 5* 0 5.98 .01
Epilepsy 3 6 0.73 .39
Hypertension 0 5* 4.65 .03
Diabetes 5 3 0.31 .58
Heart problems 3 3 0.02 .87
Asthma 8 4 1.01 .32
Thyroid problems 2 0 1.80 .18
Sensory‐related
problems
2 3 0.10 .75
*p < .05.
TABLE 2a The most recent indictable offense for the men with
intellectual disabilities who had a known history of engaging in
criminal offending behaviors
Offense type Frequency (%)
Violent offenses
Manslaughter 1 (2.2)
Murder 2 (4.3)
Attempted murder 1 (2.2)
Wounding or other act endangering life 11 (23.9)
Sexual offenses
Sexual assault (under 13) 8 (17.4)
Sexual assault (adult) 6 (13.0)
Sexual activity (under 13) 6 (13.0)
Rape 1 (2.2)
Abuse of children through prostitution and
pornography
2 (4.3)
Acquisitive offenses
Burglary 1 (2.2)
Robbery 1 (2.2)
Criminal damage
Arson 2 (4.3)
Other indictable offense 4 (8.7)
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2.2.1 | Measures
Dot‐probe task
A dot‐probe task using pictorial stimuli was used to examine atten-
tional bias. Following the presentation of a fixation cross on a com-
puter screen, pairs of images were presented followed by the
presentation of a dot. Participants were asked to make a timed re-
sponse by pressing a button to indicate the location of the dot. Pic-
torial stimuli were chosen for this task as people with intellectual
disabilities are likely to have difficulty with reading words. Each
single‐trial lasted for 11,000ms and contained (a) a fixation cross
presented for 1,000ms, (b) a fixation cross and two pictures, which
were presented directly left and right of the fixation cross for
500ms, (c) the fixation cross, and a small circle (dot‐probe) located
either to the left or right of the fixation cross. This remained until a
participant made a response, and following this, a new trial started.
Pictures were presented side by side to ensure that they were con-
gruent with the orientation of the buttons on the response box.
The main task contained 368 trials (grouped into 8 blocks of
46 trials), and 112 of these trials contained only neutral images
(neutral–neutral trial). One hundred and twenty‐eight trials were
positive affect pictures paired with a neutral image (positive
affect–neutral trial), and 128 were negative affect pictures paired
with a neutral image (negative affect–neutral trial). Within the trials
of positive affect–neutral and negative affect–neutral pairs, there
were congruent or incongruent trials; a congruent was one where the
affective picture is replaced by the dot‐probe, while an incongruent
trial was one where the neutral image was replaced by the dot‐probe.
Neutral–neutral trials are neither congruent nor incongruent.
All participants took part in a short explanation and demon-
stration of the task with the researcher before taking part in three
practice blocks of 10 trials using neutral images that were different
from those used within the main task. To progress to the main task,
participants had to respond to 9 out of 10 trials correctly in either
the first, second, or third practice block. If a participant made two or
more errors within a practice block, they completed another practice
block. Any participant who did not successfully complete the practice
blocks were excluded from the study.
Dot‐probe position, position of the affective image, position of
the person and object within the picture pair, and congruency of the
trial was counterbalanced across the left‐ and right‐side of the
computer screen. The order in which trials were presented was
randomized.
Stimuli
Twenty‐four pictures (eight positive, eight negative, and eight neu-
tral) were chosen from the International Affective Picture System
(IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008). The IAPS is a set of over 900
affect‐inducing color images that have been standardized for ex-
perimental use. Each image has been previously characterized by
valence (pleasant to unpleasant) and arousal (calm to excited), as well
as control (controlled or uncontrolled; Scherer, Dan, & Flykt, 2006).
Positive and negative images were selected for the current study
from those which scored within the top or bottom 1.5 points of
existing valence ratings, while neutral images were selected from
those which scored ±0.35 around the mean valence scale. Positive
and negative images were matched on valence and arousal ratings.
Dominance ratings were not used in the selection process because of
evidence to suggest that they explain a relatively smaller proportion
of the variance in the judgments of these stimuli (Coan &
Allen, 2007). Considering that some of the participants had a history
of sexual offenses, images of children or those of a sexual nature,
were excluded. Further, participants had committed offenses against
both persons (e.g., wounding) and objects/property (e.g., arson), and
therefore images were chosen to ensure that each group (positive,
negative, or neutral) of eight pictures contained four pictures of
people and four pictures of objects.
Software and hardware
The dot‐probe task was programmed using Psychopy v.1.75.01 and
presented using PsychoPy v.1.74.00 (Peirce, 2007). The task was
presented on Toshiba Satellite Pro C850‐1K4 laptop running Mi-
crosoft Windows 7 Enterprise Operating System with an Intel Core
i3‐3120M processor, 2.5 GHz, and 4 GB RAM. The laptop had a
15‐inch screen, 1,266 × 768 resolution, 60‐Hz refresh rate, and set at
maximum brightness. A DirectIN High Speed Button‐Box v2012
manufactured by Empirisoft was used to record participant re-
sponses and connected to the laptop via a USB port. The box has nine
buttons in landscape orientation, and the first and last keys within
the row of nine buttons were used by respondents as they are
physically separate from the middle buttons. Each key was labeled
with a black or white arrow pointing to the left or right, corre-
sponding to the left‐ or right‐side of the computer screen.
2.2.2 | Offense‐supportive cognitions
Distorted cognitions, or offense supported cognitions, were mea-
sured using the How I Think Questionnaire (HIT; Barriga &
Gibbs, 1996; Barriga, Gibbs, Potter, & Liau, 2001) which was adapted
for use with adults with intellectual disabilities by Daniel et al. (2018)
where it was read to participants. A thorough description of the
adaptations can be found elsewhere, where the authors also reported
that this measure has excellent internal consistency and good
test–retest reliability (Daniel et al., 2018).
2.2.3 | Empathy
The Empathy Quotient (Baron‐Cohen & Wheelright, 2004) is a self‐
report measure of global empathy comprising items that attempt to
assess cognitive and affective empathy, as well as social skills. Higher
scores indicate greater empathy. The measure has previously been
used with men who have intellectual disabilities where the ques-
tionnaire was read to participants and discriminates between those
with and without a history of criminal offending (Daniel et al., 2018;
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Hockley & Langdon, 2015; Langdon & Hockley, 2012). In one study,
the internal consistency was reported as α = .70 (Daniel et al., 2018).
2.2.4 | Moral reasoning
The Sociomoral Reflection Measure‐Short Form (Gibbs, Basinger, &
Fuller, 1992) was used to measure moral reasoning. This is a pro-
duction instrument which has been used with men and women with
intellectual disabilities, where it was read to participants, including
those with a history of criminal offending (Langdon, Murphy, Clare, &
Palmer, 2010; Langdon, Murphy, Clare, Steverson, & Palmer, 2011;
McDermott & Langdon, 2016) and it has been shown to possess
substantial internal consistent and good test–retest reliability
(Langdon, Murphy, et al., 2010). The measure is comprised of
11 questions pertaining to 7 constructs including Contract, Truth,
Affiliation, Life, Law, and Legal Justice.
The instrument was administered as a semistructured interview.
Higher scores are associated with a more “mature” moral develop-
mental stage. Total scores correspond to the following develop-
mental stages as follows: (a) Stage 1: 100–125, (b) Transition Stage
1(2): 126–149, (c) Transition Stage 2(1): 150–174, (d) Stage 2:
175–225, (e) Transition Stage 2(3): 226–249, (f) Transition Stage
3(2): 250–274, (g) Stage 3: 275–327, (h) Transition Stage 3(4):
326–349, (i) Transition Stage 4(3): 350–374, and (j) Stage 4:
375–400. Stages 1 and 2 are considered “immature” and Stage 1 is
associated with decision‐making based upon unilateral authority,
rules, and avoidance of punishment, while Stage 2 is associated with
decision‐making that has arisen from social interaction, but is based
upon instrumental exchanges (e.g., “if you scratch my back then I'll
scratch yours”). Stages 3 and 4 are considered “mature” stages and
are increasingly associated with further decentration within decision‐
making, where constructs such as empathy, care, good conduct,
rights, values, character, and society feature within decision‐making.
Verbatim answers on the Sociomoral Reflection Measure‐Short Form
were scored, and a second‐rater scored 25% of the completed
questionnaires; the inter‐rater reliability was ri = .96.
2.3 | Data preparation and analysis
Data generated using the dot‐probe task were inspected and in-
correct responses were removed along with reaction time data that
were more than two standard deviations above each participant's
mean (i.e., outliers). Considering the number of practice trials needed
by participants to meet the criterion necessary to complete the dot‐
probe task, 2.9% of those with an offense history needed two prac-
tice trials, while the remaining required only one trial. For those
without a history of offending behavior, 15.6% required two practice
trials, while the remaining required one trial. The reaction time data
generated during the dot‐probe task were used to calculate an at-
tention bias score for positive and negative images, as well as overall.
This was done by calculating the mean reaction time for congruent
trials (where the dot replaces the affective image), and incongruent
trials (where the dot replaces the neutral image) for both positive and
negative images. To calculate a bias score, the mean reaction time to
congruent trials was subjected from incongruent trials for positive
images and then negative images. The sum of mean reaction times to
both positive and negative congruent images was subtracted from
the sum of mean reaction times to both positive and negative con-
gruent images to calculate a total bias score. A negative score was
indicative of a bias away from affective images, while a positive score
was indicative of a bias toward affective images.
In terms of statistical analysis, initially, hierarchical linear re-
gression was used to compare those with and without an offending
history. Excluding the group comparisons for Full‐Scale IQ and age,
Full‐Scale IQ was entered on the first block to control for general
intellectual functioning, and other variables were entered on further
blocks, again to control for them, while the variable of interest was
always entered on the final block. Bootstrapping with 5,000 samples
with replacement was used, and 95% BCa CIs were calculated; dif-
ferences were considered statistically significant if the confidence
interval did not include zero.
3 | RESULTS
Controlling for Full‐Scale IQ, initial comparisons between those with
and without a history of criminal offending indicated that those with
an offense history endorsed significantly more distorted cognitions,
or offense‐supportive beliefs, 95% BCa CI [0.02, 0.39], Adj. R2 = .02,
and had significantly lower empathy scores, 95% BCa CI [−7.73,
−0.92], Adj. R2 = .08 (Table 2b). Those with an offense history also
had significantly more “mature” moral reasoning, 95% BCa CI [21.07,
48.65], Adj. R2 = .30, than those without such a history (Table 2b).
Those with an offense history scored at Transition Stage 2(3), while
those without this history scored at the earlier developmental Stage
2. Both these stages are associated with decision‐making based upon
instrumental gain (i.e., you help others because they help you).
Considering the constructs assessed by the Sociomoral Reflection
Measure‐Short Form, those with an offense history scored sig-
nificantly higher on Contract, Truth, Affiliation, Life, Law, and Legal
Justice, but not Property, 95% BCa CI [−1.97, 62.58], Adj. R
2 = .10
(Table 2b). Notably, those without an offense history scored at the
earlier Transition Stage 2(1) on Law, where decision‐making is more
likely to be characterized by appealing to unilateral authority, rules,
or avoidance of punishment, while those with such a history scored at
Transition Stage 2(3), where decision‐making is more likely to be
based upon instrumental gain.
Turning to consider attentional bias, those with an offense his-
tory had a significant bias toward negative images, 95% BCa CI [0.02,
0.14], Adj. R2 = .05, compared to those with no offending history. Men
with an offense history had a significantly smaller attention bias away
from positive images than men without this history, 95% BCa CI
[0.002, 0.09], Adj. R2 = .02. When responses to both negative and
positive images were combined, men with intellectual disabilities who
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had a history of criminal offending had a significant bias toward af-
fective images, 95% BCa CI [0.02, 0.11], Adj. R
2 = .05, compared to
men without such a history (Figure 1).
Controlling for Full‐Scale IQ and offense history revealed that
distorted cognitions significantly predicted attentional bias in men
with intellectual disabilities, 95% BCa CI [0.001, 0.09], Adj. R
2 = .07,
while offense history remained a significant predictor, 95% BCa CI
[0.01, 0.10], Adj. R2 = .07. Neither empathy, 95% BCa CI [−0.002,
0.004], Adj. R2 = .04, nor moral reasoning, 95% BCa CI [−0.001,
0.001], Adj. R2 = .04, significantly predicted attention bias, and again,
offense history remained a significant predictor in both regression
models (Table 3). Considering whether attentional bias is a significant
predictor of distorted cognitions, again while controlling for Full‐
Scale IQ and offense history, revealed that distorted cognitions
predicted attentional bias, having controlled for both Full‐Scale IQ
and offense history, 95% BCa CI [0.03, 1.84], Adj. R
2 = .03. However,
attentional bias did not significantly predict empathy, 95% BCa CI
[−15.60, 19.15], Adj. R2 = .09, or moral reasoning, 95% BCa CI
[−78.38, 74.99], Adj. R2 = .31 (Table 4).
4 | DISCUSSION
The findings from this study indicated that men with intellectual
disabilities who have a history of committing crimes have an atten-
tional bias toward negative affective stimuli, while those without this
history had an attention bias away from negative affective stimuli.
Considering positive images, those with an offense history had a
significantly smaller bias away from positive images than those
without this history. Combining bias scores to positive and negative
images revealed that those with an offense history had a bias toward
affective images. These findings are similar to that reported by others
using samples of offenders who do not have intellectual disabilities
(Chan et al., 2010; Ciardha & Gormley, 2012; Domes et al., 2013;
Gallagher‐Duffy et al., 2009; Smith & Waterman, 2003, 2004). In
addition, and as reported by others, men with intellectual disabilities
and a history of offending endorsed more distorted cognitions (Da-
niel et al., 2018; Langdon & Talbot, 2006; Langdon, Murphy,
et al., 2011; Lindsay & Michie, 2004; Lindsay et al., 2006), and re-
ported less general empathy (Hockley & Langdon, 2015; Langdon &
TABLE 2b Descriptive data
Offending history (n = 46) No offending history (n = 51)
Measure M SD M SD B SE B β t 95% BCa CI
Age 33.49 12.67 41.16 13.74 −7.67 2.71 −.28 −2.83 −12.98, −2.67*
Full‐Scale IQ 66.20 4.67 60.70 5.13 2.50 1.00 .24 2.50 0.59, 4.40*
Sociomoral Reflection Measure‐Short Form
Contract 242.02 40.68 218.33 36.78 23.76 8.20 .30 2.90 7.94, 40.72*
Truth 243.11 63.60 204.00 60.47 32.41 12.90 .25 2.15 7.55, 58.46*
Affiliation 255.76 56.66 225.00 61.24 29.80 12.53 .25 2.38 4.78, 56.44*
Life 260.33 47.31 218.50 49.18 35.60 9.88 .34 3.60 15.77, 55.44*
Property 215.56 72.94 177.55 75.04 29.04 15.45 .19 1.88 −1.97, 62.58
Law 233.33 89.82 160.20 72.87 62.32 16.89 .35 3.69 27.85, 97.73*
Legal justice 253.26 85.25 179.35 81.36 69.35 17.78 .38 3.90 32.83, 105.71*
Total score 245.17 34.74 205.54 33.81 34.76 6.96 .44 5.00 21.07, 48.65*
How I Think Questionnaire
Covert 1.96 0.55 1.80 0.46 0.18 0.11 .15 1.47 −0.04, 0.35
Overt 2.07 5.4 1.83 0.50 0.25 0.11 .24 2.33 0.05, 0.45*
Total 2.01 0.52 1.81 0.44 0.20 0.10 .21 1.99 0.02, 0.39*
Empathy Quotient 31.63 8.13 36.65 9.60 −4.29 1.86 −.233 −2.31 −7.73, −0.92*
Note: Group comparisons using data from the Sociomoral Reflection Measure‐Short Form, How I Think Questionnaire, and the Empathy Quotient were
made controlling for Full‐Scale IQ.
Abbreviations: 95% BCa CI, 95% bias‐corrected‐and‐accelerated confidence intervals; SD, standard deviation; SE, standard error.
*p < .05.
F IGURE 1 Attention bias toward positive and negative pictures
for those with and without an offense history
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Hockley, 2012); however, not all previous studies have reported that
men with intellectual disabilities who have a history of committing
crimes score lower on measures of empathy (Beail & Proctor, 2004;
Langdon, Murphy, et al., 2011; Proctor & Beail, 2007; Ralfs &
Beail, 2012) than men without such a history, which is likely related
to measurement and sampling.
Further, men with intellectual disabilities who had a history of
committing crimes had more “mature” moral reasoning than those
without such a history. This finding has been reported in other stu-
dies (Langdon, Murphy, et al., 2011; McDermott & Langdon, 2016),
and the literature in this area has been previously reviewed
(Langdon, Clare, & Murphy, 2010), but the finding is inconsistent with
TABLE 3 Distorted cognitions, empathy, and moral reasoning
were entered into separate hierarchical regression models to
determine whether each predicted attentional bias having controlled
for Full‐Scale IQ and whether participants did or did not have an
offending history
Attentional bias
Predictor variable B SE B β t 95% BCa CI
Block 1
Constant 0.09 0.15 0.58 −0.20, 0.40
Full‐Scale IQ −0.002 0.002 −.080 −0.73 −0.01, 0.003
Block 2
Constant 1.75 0.15 1.17 −0.11, 0.50
Full‐Scale IQ −0.004 0.002 −.66 −1.486 −0.01, 0.001
Group 0.06 0.02 .271 2.434 0.02, 0.11*
Block 3
Constant 0.11 0.15 0.70 −0.16, 0.41
Full‐Scale IQ −0.004 0.002 −.172 −1.56 −0.01, 0.001
Group 0.05 0.02 .244 2.19 0.01, 0.10*
Distorted
cognitions
0.04 0.02 .181 1.70 0.001, 0.09*
F(3, 85) = 3.18, p = .03; Adj. R2 = .07
Block 3—empathy
Constant 0.14 0.17 0.83 −0.11, 0.42
Full‐Scale IQ −0.003 0.002 −.157 −1.40 −0.01, 0.001
Group 0.06 0.03 .061 2.48 0.01, 0.12*
Empathy 0.001 0.001 .061 0.55 −0.002, 0.004
F(3, 85) = 2.25, p = .09; Adj. R2 = .04
Block 3—moral reasoning
Constant 0.18 0.15 1.18 −0.11, 0.52
Full‐Scale IQ −0.003 0.003 −.156 −1.31 −0.01, 0.001
Group 0.06 0.03 .284 2.29 0.02, 0.12*
Moral reasoning <1 0.00 −.031 −0.240 −0.001, 0.001
F(3, 85) = 2.16, p = .10; Adj. R2 = .04
Abbreviations: 95% BCa CI, 95% bias‐corrected‐and‐accelerated
confidence intervals; SE, standard error.
*p < .05.
TABLE 4 Distorted cognitions, empathy, or moral reasoning was
predicted using attentional bias having controlled for other variables,
including Full‐Scale IQ and group within hierarchical regression
Predictor variable B SE B β t 95% BCa CI
Distorted cognitions
Block 1
Constant 1.44 0.66 2.19 0.11, 2.72*
Full‐Scale IQ 0.01 0.011 .08 0.75 −0.01, 0.03
Block 2
Constant 1.65 0.67 2.46 0.29, 2.97*
Full‐Scale IQ 0.003 0.01 .03 0.30 −0.02, 0.03
Group 0.015 0.11 .15 1.33 −0.07, 0.36
Block 3
Constant 1.501 0.67 2.25 0.14, 2.85*
Full‐Scale IQ 0.001 0.01 .07 0.57 −0.02, 0.03
Group 0.10 0.11 .10 0.86 −0.11, 0.30
Attentional bias 0.83 0.49 .19 1.70 0.03, 1.84*
F(3, 85) = 1.76, p = .16; Adj. R2 = .03
Empathy
Block 1
Constant 58.88 12.50 4.71 34.18, 88.26*
Full‐Scale IQ −0.40 0.21 −.21 −1.99 −0.83, −0.03
Block 2
Constant 53.22 12.71 4.19 28.00, 82.06*
Full‐Scale IQ −0.28 0.21 −.15 −1.33 −0.71, 0.01
Group −3.80 2.07 −.20 −1.84 −7.80, 0.14
Block 3
Constant 52.32 12.87 7.07 27.31, 80.18*
Full‐Scale IQ −0.26 −0.004 −.22 −1.22 −0.72, 0.16
Group −4.10 2.15 −.22 1.91 −8.10, −0.16*
Attentional bias 5.12 9.38 .06 0.55 −15.60, 19.15
F(3, 85) = 2.56, p = .06; Adj. R2 = .09
Moral reasoning
Block 1
Constant 7.81 49.40 0.16 −71.77, 89.61
Full‐Scale IQ 3.54 0.80 .44 4.45 2.28, 4.76*
Block 2
Constant 55.82 46.39 1.20 −25.41, 150.85
Full‐Scale IQ 2.51 0.77 .31 3.28 1.09, 3.73*
Group 32.22 7.56 .40 4.26 17.22, 48.11*
Block 3
Constant 57.25 47.04 1.22 −25.59, 152.96]
Full‐Scale IQ 2.48 0.78 .31 3.18 1.02, 3.77*
Group 32.71 7.87 .41 4.16 16.70, 49.45*
Attentional bias −8.18 34.29 −.02 −0.24 −78.38, 74.99
F(3, 85) = 13.86, p < .000; Adj. R2 = .31
Abbreviations: 95% BCa CI, 95% bias‐corrected‐and‐accelerated
confidence intervals; SE, standard error.
*p < .05.
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meta‐analytic work showing an inverse relationship between moral
development and criminal offending (Van Vugt et al., 2011), where
increasingly “mature” moral reasoning is associated with less criminal
behavior. This is likely to be associated with the lack of individuals
within these studies who present with moral reasoning characterized
by the earliest developmental stages, which can be seen within some
adults with intellectual disabilities. Wilson and Herrnstein (1985)
hypothesized that the relationship between crime and intelligence is
curvilinear, and within the current study, while those with a history
of committing crimes had more “mature” moral reasoning than those
without, both groups had a moral developmental stage that has been
associated with criminal offending behavior in samples of adolescents
(Blasi, 1983; Gregg, Gibbs, & Basinger, 1994; Nelson, Smith, &
Dodd, 1990). Langdon, Clare, and Murphy (2011) previously hy-
pothesized that the relationship between moral development and
illegal behavior is curvilinear and this relationship is actually mod-
erated by general intellectual functioning, with those evidencing the
highest and lowest moral development stages being the least likely to
engage in illegal behavior, while they will also have higher and lower
levels of general intellectual functioning. Examining the moral de-
velopmental stage of participants across the constructs assessed by
the Sociomoral Reflection Measure‐Short Form, for those with no
history of criminal offending, moral reasoning about the Law was
more “immature” and associated with reasoning likely to characterize
an earlier stage, and based upon adherence to rules and avoidance of
punishment, while this group also had a significantly lower Full‐Scale
IQ; this may partially explain why these participants did not have a
history of criminal offending. This finding has been previously re-
ported (Langdon, Murphy, et al., 2011; McDermott & Langdon, 2016),
and Langdon, Clare, et al. (2011) discussed this further where they
argued that many people with intellectual disabilities may be at lower
risk of committing criminal offenses because they present with
“immature” moral reasoning. Further evidence of a curvilinear re-
lationship between crime and intelligence was reported by Mears and
Cochran (2013) using a large sample from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth, and they supposed that moral development may
be related to intelligence and further explain this curvilinear
relationship.
Both offense history and distorted cognitions predicted atten-
tional bias while offense history was controlled within our regression
model. However, neither empathy nor moral reasoning predicted
attentional bias while controlling for offense history. Further, at-
tentional bias predicted distorted cognitions, having controlled for
offense history, while this was not the case for empathy or moral
reasoning. These results are partially consistent with the framework
proposed by Garrigan et al. (2018). First, those with a history of
engaging in criminal offending behavior had an attentional bias to-
ward affective images when both positive and negative images were
combined, increased distorted cognitions, lower empathy and dif-
ferent moral reasoning than those without this history indicating the
information processing and moral decision‐making of those with an
offense history is different than those without such a history. Second,
attentional bias was related to distorted cognitions, and distorted
cognitions were related to attentional bias, but some of the variance
in attentional bias scores remained explained by offense history after
distorted cognitions were entered into the regression model. Within
the Social Information Processing Moral Decision Making framework
(Garrigan et al., 2018), attributions and beliefs within Step 2: the
interpretation of cues, are thought to be affected by encoding within
Step 1, and vice versa, and our findings appear consistent with this
hypothesized relationship.
Third, Garrigan et al. (2018) suggested the encoding of cues
within Step 1 of the framework is hypothesized to be affected by
empathic responsiveness, but we did not find a relationship between
the measure of empathy used and attentional bias, or vice versa,
controlling for offense history. A possible reason for this is that the
empathy quotient is a measure of cognitive and affective empathy,
and associated social skills (Lawrence, Shaw, Baron‐Cohen, & David,
2004), but it may not index empathy responsiveness appropriately as
other laboratory‐based methods where affect is aroused (Robinson,
Roberts, Strayer, & Koopman, 2007). As such, the measure of em-
pathy used may be more distally related to the information proces-
sing that occurred during the dot‐probe task. Fourth, moral
judgments within Step 2 are expected to influence encoding within
Step 1, and again, vice versa. However, within the current study
moral reasoning did not predict attention bias, nor did attention bias
predict moral reasoning after controlling for offense history. As a
measure of moral reasoning was used to allow participants to be
characterized into stages, rather than make moral judgments about
the images they were viewing, a relationship may not have been
found. As such, the measure of moral reasoning may also index
reasoning that is more distal to attentional bias, while distorted
cognitions, are more proximal.
There are some strengths and weaknesses associated with the
current study. A convenience sample of participants was used within
the study, but men with an offense history had a documented history
of serious offending that necessitated detention within hospital, in-
dicating that they had substantial conduct‐related problems, which is
a strength. We did make use of robust eligibility criteria, and as is the
case with the dot‐probe task, the order of presentation of pairs of
images was randomized. Also, the use of pictures, rather than words,
has clear advantages for people with intellectual disabilities who are
likely to have difficulties with reading rapidly.
Unfortunately, as this is a sample that is difficult to recruit into
research studies, our sample size was too small to allow for more
complex analysis. As such, our findings are merely correlational,
which is a substantial weakness. Further, it may be the case that
difficulties with empathy, distorted cognitions, and moral reasoning
may vary with offense type and level of intellectual disability. For
example, sexual offenders with intellectual disabilities may have
more difficulties with empathy in some contexts, but not other
contexts (Hockley & Langdon, 2015; Langdon & Hockley, 2012).
While there is some evidence that affective empathy may relate to
violent crime in teenagers (Jolliffe & Farrington, 2007), there is fur-
ther evidence that cognitive empathy is more likely related to of-
fending than affective empathy (van Langen, Wissink, van Vugt, Van
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der Stouwe, & Stams, 2014). Jolliffe and Farrington (2004) demon-
strated that differences in empathy between offenders and non‐
offenders could be accounted for by intelligence and socioeconomic
status. Within this study, we made use of a mixed sample of offen-
ders, which varied according to offense type (e.g., violent offenders
and sexual offenders), which may have had an impact upon our
findings, and all had intellectual disabilities with likely atypical
development within the affective domain.
Finally, considering the finding that men with intellectual dis-
abilities who have a history of criminal offending behavior have an
attentional bias that is different from those without such a history,
the question as to whether procedures to modify such a bias would
help address forensic risk needs to be addressed. While there is
evidence that attention bias modification training is associated with
a small effect size for symptoms of anxiety (Mogoase, David, &
Koster, 2014), such procedures may offer an opportunity for enga-
ging people with intellectual disabilities within psychological thera-
pies who may not be able to take part in traditional talking‐based
psychological interventions to target criminogenic risk
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